Title: Paul Fitzgerald and Elizabeth Gould: Afghanistan's Untold Story

" This is the WGBH forum network. Good evening and welcome to Cambridge forum now you can all hear it the welcome which was sincere when he couldn't hear it but his -- now to. My pets -- European directors forum. And I am delighted to see this crowd here tonight it didn't snow it's cold but you're all here to here are. Speakers. Elizabeth schooled and Paul Fitzgerald discussing their new book invisible history Afghanistan S untold story. -- form tonight is moderated by ambassador Charles Dunbar. Professor of international relations at Boston University. Ambassador Dunbar was the State Department foreign service officer from 1962. To 1993. Among his other postings he served as -- in you know Afghanistan twice. From 1967. To 1970. And then again from 1981. To in 1983. When he was -- affair. He later worked in Washington on developing in carrying out political strategy for the Afghan resistance. After our speakers formal remarks he will open a dialogue with some questions for them. And after those initial questions he'll open the discussion to the audience and that is your -- to come to the microphone. Theory is one thing we don't want to record. And that you on the what that is -- is to bring up your cellphone or other electronic device. So. Yes check and now now is the perfect time to turn them off. And like you're doing that here's our moderator. Introduced the program in their speakers."

" Thank you and welcome to the Cambridge forum. On Afghanistan's. Untold story. With Paul Fitzgerald. And Elizabeth -- I'm Charles -- I teach international relations at Boston university. And worked for seven years in -- on Afghanistan as an American diplomat. It is not news that the Obama administration faces a crisis in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Too interlinked countries that I believe are leading national security problem. Pursuing with the British Raj termed a forward policy in its nineteenth century great game with the imperial Russia. The president seems bent on a surge in US troops in Afghanistan. And has chosen forward diplomat. Richard Holbrooke as our special envoy. This evening we consider whether the administration can succeed. Where its predecessor. And others who -- Kipling words. Tried to hustle east. Have failed. Veteran journalist Paul Fitzgerald journalism schools have strong views on so. There in nineteen -- in 1981. As the perfect that's the first US television team allowed to -- Afghanistan. Following the Soviet occupation. They've found that the country and its people did not fit the preconceptions. Of their employer. CBS news. To correct prevailing stereotypes. They made the noted noted PBS documentary. Afghanistan between three worlds in 1983. In the 1980s and nineties. They kept working in Afghanistan. Producing a script with Oliver Stone. Reports for ABC's Nightline. And a book women for halftime women shattering myths and claiming the future. -- new book invisible history Afghanistan and untold story. Looks -- Afghanistan's. Current -- Against the backdrop. Of its history. Pleasing join me. In welcoming Paul Fitzgerald and Elizabeth who moved to Cambridge for."

" We wish to thank the Cambridge -- for hosting us this evening and ambassador Charles Dunbar. Graciously agreed to moderate. We first met Charles in 1983. On her second trip to coupled with Harvard University. You know Harvard negotiation project director Roger Fisher. At the time Charles was assures -- affair at the American Embassy. I know that Charles shares with us deep concern for the Afghan people and the need to help them rebuild their country after their sacrifice is 36 years. I also know that we charles' extensive knowledge of Afghanistan's long history of progressive Islamic culture. And their desire for democracy he can help correct in -- Harrison's words. Quote decades biased journalistic and academic writing this is covered up the destructive and self defeating US role there. I had hoped that the American efforts which preceded the Soviet invasion to lure them into their own Vietnam and lead them to death there. Would have become Colin common knowledge by now. But some ideas from the past die hard. I had no more than picked up my Boston Globe this morning to have Jeff Jacoby remind me of those Cold War nightmares of the 1950s. Jacoby wrote quote it wasn't until the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979. -- Carter finally woke to his naivete. Carter's failure to understand the threat posed by the Soviet empire had costly consequences for America. And the world. Will that pattern now be repeated with Barack Obama and the threat from radical Islam. I think that's a good question. As a host of a weekly public affairs program -- pat Robertson's Christian broadcasting network affiliate in Boston in 1979. I was very familiar with this kind of Cold War language. It was my obligation to balance the right wing apocalypse is coming programming. That streamed from the network so when Robertson aired the anti strategic arms limitation talks documentary. The salt syndrome as a public service message. It gave us the opportunity to take on the nuclear arms race. So in the summer of 1979. We began production of a documentary called the arms race and the economy a delicate balance. During the next few months numerous experts including John Kenneth Galbraith went their experience to our understanding. Of the unseen damage that abandoning to tie -- would represented to the civilian economy and the United States. We learned that the arms race wasn't just about defending the United States. That the arms race was a dark world -- business science and politics ruled over by a self described priesthood have experts. Galbraith insisted that renewing the Cold War which ultimately destroy the American economy. That fall in Washington the arms control and disarmament agency was one of the last holdouts of sanity in a rolling see it hysterical. Neo conservative accusations about American security. Was the Soviet Union really planning a sneak attack on the United States with nuclear weapons as they claimed. With salt to really just a public relations scheme by Moscow to put us off guard. In hindsight we know that these claims weren't true. The Soviet Union was actually -- driven to salt by its weakness and not strike. But when the Soviets cross their southern border into Afghanistan and it played out on America's TV screens like World War II Hollywood the movie. Hardly a soul realized. That a trap had been set to give the Soviets their own Vietnam and the Soviets had taken the day. But no one was supposed to know that time. Instead -- crop of neo conservative experts appeared on the scene claiming that the Soviets were running out of oil. And using Afghanistan as a staging ground to conquer the Middle East. By the time our program aired that went to the argument was no longer whether our government should call a halt to the nuclear arms race. And reinvest in the civilian economy. The Carter administration had been repackaged into a Cold War box and shipped back to 1947. With the debate re focused not on whether -- on how much was to be spent on the new Cold War. Our decision in the fall of 1982 request permission from the Afghan government to enter Afghanistan and see for ourselves what the Soviets were doing. Grew from the startling change in the sense. Our journey there in the spring of 1981 under contract CBS news would forever in the -- and haze of Reagan era propaganda. Afghanistan was a progressive Third World country. Trying to pull itself into the twentieth century since 1973. It has been the object of covert attacks from Pakistan's intelligence service the ISI. With the intention of overthrowing its government and replacing it with one headed by Islamic extremists. A 1978 -- had topple that government and replace it with a narrowly based nominally Marxist oriented group. Who found themselves. According to a declassified US cable. At the mercy of quote Chinese Iranian Pakistan any Arabian peninsula access with US support. I'll repeat that. Quote the Marxist found themselves at the mercy of the Chinese a rainy in Pakistan any Arabian peninsula access with US support. Far from the simplistic picture of good versus evil portrayed by the American media. Ethnic feuding modernization women's rights a 50% infant mortality rate. And Islamic extremism fuel like chronic poverty in foreign agents were all factors in the country's instability. Add to that -- 200 years colonial pressure. From Russia and Britain that saw Britain's -- occupy Afghanistan and on three separate occasions. But this was something that the American public was not to be informed. CBS news ran a story about a trip a month after our return but instead of focusing on the effects. Of the ISI war being waged from Pakistan the CBS -- chose to focus on Soviet invaders which we never saw. In the words of -- Snyder former director of the United States and from agents in information agencies worldwide television and film service in his 1995. Book. Warriors of disinformation. Quote the war in Afghanistan was the American government's need for TV movie. It was a war in which media coverage was purchased from a mail order catalogue and uncle Sam -- the warehouse. Afghanistan was a public relations nightmare from Moscow but the public relations dream come true for Washington. And quote. Given the threat to world peace that the Soviet presence in Afghanistan and represented we decided to challenge the public relations campaign coming from the Reagan adminstration. And -- will -- tell you what we discovered. For us."

" The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and continued to raise serious questions that nobody in the mainstream media. Was asking. And it was is it something invisible was driving the conflict and we were determined to find out what it was. And against this backdrop we put together a trip in 1983. With Harvard association project director Roger Fisher for ABC Nightline that reveal who we thought with a stunning opportunity. Far from being a first step towards the Persian gulf the Soviet Union was anxious to get out. The chief Afghan specialist told Roger point blank. Quote give the six months to save face and will leave the Afghans to solve their own problems. We make mistakes but we're not stupid. We want to go home. End quote. When we return from capitol with this story however we were greeted with blank stares. It appeared our perspective from the Afghan front made life complicated for the Nightline staff. Rejected as a news story by ABC world news tonight we were granted 1 Thursday evening after midnight to make its case for Soviet withdrawal. Roger laid out the facts. Since neither the Soviets and the motion dean could win that's creating a stalemate. It was in the interest of the United States to accept the Soviet offer that once the insurgency flowing from Pakistan to stop. They would go home. But the cards -- stacked against Roger. Ted Koppel directed the discussion away from -- firsthand observation and towards the -- of Soviet dissident Vladimir the past ski. While painting the Soviet system driven to -- Middle East oil they could never stopped. The housekeeper announced that there was no possibility. Of negotiating the Soviets out of Afghanistan. And then Koppel introduced Abdul Rahim. A political officer of Johnny on Islam. Koppel described as quote. Rahim is here in the United States under the auspices of two American organizations concerned with democracy in Afghanistan. The Afghan relief committee and freedom house and well. Had there been concern about democracy in Afghanistan did Johnny -- would never have been chosen by the Afghan relief committee. Or freedom house. Rather than promoting democracy is promoted the strictest interpretation of Islamic law as a replacement for western style democracy. Supported by right wing Pakistan any saudis in our interest throughout the 1970s. It destroyed democratic political interest in Pakistan. And then solidified its dominance through the dictatorship -- we'll talk. Who was also by the way Charlie Wilson's conduit for US aid to the motion dean. And as it turned out. It was Charlie Wilson's effort to increase pressure on the Soviets with more money in high tech weapons to the mujahideen. That help keep the Soviets in Afghanistan for another six years. Because of the way the program was -- it left the impression that there was no reason to further any discussion about negotiating the Soviets out of Afghanistan. Over the years is we continue to watch all efforts to negotiate peace in Afghanistan overruled by invisible forces that continue to promote campaign of disinformation. It kept Americans in the dark. We kept searching for answers. It wasn't until Robert Gates 1997. Book from the shadows. And to be true American role begin to emerge publicly. Quoting from a memo sent to CIA director Stansfield turner to President Carter in January 16 1980. Just weeks after the Soviet invasion turner wrote. It's unlikely that the Soviet occupation is a pre plan first step in the implementation of the good design. For the rapid establishment of hegemonic control over all of South Asia. The occupation may have been it reluctantly authorized response to what was perceived by the Kremlin as an imminent and irreversible deterioration. Of the already established position. In a country within the Soviets legitimate sphere of influence end quote. Then an interview in 1998. By president Carter's National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski reveal the truth that we had suspected. For a quite a long time. According to the official version of history's CIA eat the mujahideen began after the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan in December 27 1979. But the reality is completely otherwise. It was July 3 1979. The President Carter signed the first directive. For secret aid to be opponents of the pro Soviet regime. This -- was going to reduce the Soviet military adventure in intervention. Throwing the Russians in the afternoon track. The day that the Soviets officially crossed the border I wrote to President Carter we now have the opportunity of giving the USSR. It's Vietnam War. -- It is ironic that the election of Jimmy Carter in 1976 was built on hope at the end of the Cold War was near. But instead. By authorizing the covert operation that lured the Soviets into Afghanistan Carter administrations that stage. For devastating conflict is now entering its fourth. Decade. Our Nightline experienced revealed how the conceptual framework of Cold War journalism maintained. The child like Reagan -- good versus evil illusion. When the facts on the ground cried out for fresh approach the failure of the American media to challenge the underlying assumptions of covert action in Afghanistan. Not only prolong the war for another six years. It made 9/11 and the continuing crisis in Afghanistan inevitable. Ultimately what was so disturbing to us was to confirm. That the Afghan campaign was always about winning the Cold War. Destroying Soviet Union while increasing the defense spending to the highest level since world work to. There never was concerned about the terrible and lasting price this plan would have on Afghanistan of people the region and the American people as well. In 1979. The Soviet Union and the US faced a crossroads that has delivered us here today. It's critical that the record be set straight on the US role in that deliverance for the American people. We must finally stop and reflect on what really happened. What were we trying to accomplish. And what did we accomplish. For our own well being. As a nation we must answer these questions honestly. And I also think that we must then get that message to the president. Thank you."

" Thank you mr. Fitzgerald and his goes. To start when I'm shall be a lively discussion. Let me put two related questions to you and I put this question these questions. Having read. And not all of your book because I do have certain responsibilities at Boston university. And -- declining. Reading speed. Having received it three days ago I was not able to read from cover to cover. But I do get a sense of the music of the book and this leads me to ask. These two questions. First. Two point if any extent. Do you attribute the Soviets decision. To withdraw their forces from Afghanistan. A decision that long serving Soviet ambassador. In Washington. And it only took putting and says is actually taken in 1985. He's such a very specific meeting when it happened. It. To what extent. Do you think that the Afghan resistance. To the Soviet occupation. And by extension. To the aid. That resistance recede from Pakistan. Supported. By the US. Saudi Arabia and China was important. And second. How much do you think that defeat in Afghanistan. Contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union."

" All right step up to the plane was too. The first question Soviet decision to withdraw I think that the certainly the mujaheddin. Succeeded in keeping the Soviets bogged down. 46 or seven years. Past the point one. Wouldn't we personally experienced they were willing to to withdraw. A lot of the documentation that we come across including documents from the Rand corporation Francis who keep -- isn't there. Shortly after the Soviets invaded. Made it pretty clear that the Soviets. Did not wish to go in there in the first place we're holding down their casualties and one -- to basically. Stabilize the situation. And get out. Other research that we've come across also seems to indicate that. The Soviets. First of all did not. Wish to. Happen the people's Democratic Party Marxist party -- first place the Soviets were desperate to try. Put some kind of coalition government together before they went and and then we're desperate equally desperate after they invaded. To put a coalition together they wanted India Pakistan -- can they wanted the king to combat. But Pakistan -- did not want the -- ruling over -- as a government in exile in Pakistan because of the -- to understand issue there was some nationalist issue. The mujahideen forces as supported by the United States and Saudi Arabia did tied the Soviets down and extended it much longer. The second part on the question is where they successful doing this yes -- were successful in holding them there. Will be successful in defeating them there were certain tactics that that the that the Mujahedeen used. As we're discovering our ourselves as the British discovered in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. That make it very difficult to fight this kind of warfare and that kind of place particularly Afghanistan. Was the defeat. Could you attribute to defeat in Afghanistan to the -- that it collapse of the Soviet Union. Paul warranty in our interview with him we interviewed him for the original -- documentary back in 1979. And again in 1993. And Paul warn key said that he'd been to Moscow with met with the Defense Secretary inactive -- back in the 1960s. And at the time. A lot of mid level Soviet bureaucrats came to him and and said look. We know the system has a limited lifespan here in the Soviet Union we know it can't last how do we get out and it. And that was the kind of thing that inspired Paul warranties to helped negotiate the so one insult to treaties. And it was something that he believed had day the United States in -- embraced it instead of going veering to the right. That the Soviets never would have invaded Afghanistan in the first place. So from our perspective and from the research all -- we can see and from our visits to the Soviet Union in 1980 and 1987. I would say that we saw the the fact that the Soviet Union was a Third World country. We nearly developed with an arms race and an arms industry that was capable of competing. With the United States and all other areas Swiss. Completely. Inferior."

" Okay what I would have. A lot more questions -- I would like to ask and and bristling with comments as well but. What I would like to do now instead. Is to say that you -- joining us at the Cambridge forum as we continue our discussion. About the understands invisible history. With journalist Paul Fitzgerald. And Elizabeth school. As you know there is a microphone here now. And I would like to call on people. To come to the microphone. And ask their questions. And so please do so. It's."

" Well I didn't necessary expected the first I hope many others will follow me. I'm want to make it very brief statement and a question. The statement is that. Mine is Michael grow our way. I tried to stay informed I've been active American politics. Since Adlai Stevenson's campaign and John F Kennedy and that's when a long time ago. I've worked many presidential campaigns and I thought I was medium well informed. I realized tonight. How totally ignorant I am. The Afghan history of the role of our country there. Nothing you told me tonight surprise me except how -- I was Oval Office. Which I suppose is probably my fault and partly because the role in the US media that you mentioned not wanting it to seem true. Facts there. I work for Barack Obama's election. I'm appalled that he thinks the solution to everything. In that part of the world is more bombing in more troops. My question for you news. If we could reach his administration. If we could turn around that militaristic. Bombed civilians. Create democracy from them barrels or whatever else underlying -- he has. Can you visualize for us a healthy future for Afghanistan. What little I know for example as is their major export crop is -- or maybe one of their major export. Last night many of us heard the Nobel Peace Prize winner Mohammed Yunus. From Bangladesh. Talk about his thirty years venture with the banks and then finally getting up in creating the grameen bank in creating a concept of micro loans. I've read both of his books if you haven't bought them folks please by at least the second when creating a world without poverty. Is there any path that you could visualize for us as a nation if we turned around and became intelligent. To help the Afghan people. Out of the quagmire -- in and out of this terrible history. Can you visualize micro loans -- grameen bank in in in Afghanistan terrorism no prayer thank."

" Here it will first of all there is there's no question that. A very small amount of money goes a very long way in Afghanistan -- the problems with the reconstruction moneys that. So little is getting to the right places and it's it is it. There's been a lot of focus on the corruption -- Karzai's government. And that's certainly a factor but there is -- actually much larger form of corruption that's going on. And that is the way in which the entire reconstruction money is being distributed -- international level. The truth is that you're looking at you know pennies on the dollar getting too into. The actual hands of Afghans in in form form reconstruction. So that's one of the reasons why after really -- thirty years of war on and off. You basically have an Adam -- society. It would require a complete rebuilding and a civil society. And this is really the point. There are definitely Afghans who are more than willing given the proper support that they reclaim their society when we were there in 2002. We were. Working with seem wildly missing. And human rights expert and she was president of refugee women in development. And she wanted to run training programs for indigenous women led ngos. In Afghanistan. And these organizations in many cases that were running during the talent on Arab. They had little to no financing during that time their lives are threatened and yet they never stopped. Health care. Schools and and and being an inspiration to people during the most horrible time fatale on era. They were not getting the funding they were still operating. But how long can you go how how far are these kinds of indigenous organizations supposed to go NEC. The kind of money that is talked about that's coming and it never gets to the right level never gets to the right places. So that's part of the reason -- I would say is no question that. The ideas for reconstruction. That would work had actually been out there for twenty years. I've certainly ever since the Soviets withdrew there are people who understood what the Afghans needed. To reclaim their country I think is in 1992. That even Peter Thompson who was the special envoy. Two on them mujahideen. Was comment it was was it recommending. That with a very small kind of investment we could have actually help the Afghan people reclaim the moderates could reclaim Afghanistan we could sideline the extremists. Many many people have come up with very common sense ideas about how to rebuild Afghanistan. The problem seems to be that no administration. Actually implements the obvious solution that seems to be more of the problem. So that's where we have to focus our attention why is it that the low cost the obvious is not done."

" that Bosnia and Kosovo these things weren't done and the and the effects were successful. But a great deal more resources are actually applied there and they were applied successfully correctly. So why weren't they done in Afghanistan that way it's a good question."

" I'm Charles -- from the Kennedy school. Former colleague. And best -- Dunbar Morocco. In the interest of full disclosure. I was the chief of the -- self."

" Asian division and CIA from 1979. To 1984. I have some opinions on the current Afghan situation which are contained. In an article in the world policy journal last November and -- thirtieth anniversary issue. I just want to make to sure points. One. I think your account of the Russian motivation. At the time the invasion and afterwards. Strikes me -- quite authentic. Prime minister Christine didn't vote for the intervention he had just -- and he was absent from the meeting. The second want to let them make this business about efficiency. About whom I have the greatest respect. And he might well that is if you point out he did say this gives a great opportunity. Now that the Soviets had -- But the idea. That we -- the Soviets into Afghanistan is I think it is totally off. We were approached by the Pakistan intelligence service to give some aid to the mujahideen in the countryside you posted at comments government. And it was given in 1979 before the Soviet invasion but he was not lethal aid to those communications equipment. And propaganda chemicals can."

" Accused the code. Both sports. Com. I was to be scored ten years. Off and -- we drove to Afghanistan in the early sixties. My question is much more timely because it it affects also how we. Have distorted impression what was going on in Iraq. And he probably know of great importance and know what I guess is best seller if you if you look two cups of tea. We have colleagues -- in. Peaceful and Afghanistan. And we cannot figure out what I did distorting factors. Whether it's Iraq but does Pakistan. That are continually at work so the good intentions good descriptions realistic descriptions. -- simply dismissed even tonight we listen to the person. Was pointing out that mr. Madoff. Had been. That. They're gonna have been warned. Mister Madoff was up something for ten years and it systemically. Our system is unable to hear. Well intended guidance to take us off with teens to be some sort of terrible course. And think it's important for us -- some ideas how -- week. You know what this is distorting factor in how we produce a better course. When we worked hard to elect mr. Obama."

" I think that then you know if it's an interesting idea of the fact that. One of America's greatest capacities is our belief. That. Men can reform himself. That we can renew our -- and become something different and better. And so I think. Perhaps it's at the core of who we are as Americans we always believe that we can be helpful and much of the world I believe up until the very short time ago believed it too. You could call -- I suppose and one on one on the one hand you know an immense capacity for self delusion. In terms of believing mr. Madoff is a very good example of how far that delusion can ago. And it's also when the dilution falls apart you also realize how catastrophic. That can be. In the writing of our book in the following this issue from our perspective for thirty years and I would want to thank the people who had there. Our government service for such a long time being able to add their voices tonight mister -- mister cogan. I think that. We've all reached a point where in the 21 century as I said at the beginning of the book. We've reached the age of maturity. We've reached an age of complexity where we have to stop defining good versus evil. And in black and white frame war and had a -- framework McCain -- and was an ancient heresy in the in the ancient world and for very good reason. It's simply too simple. It doesn't do the job. And people go about their business they do their work they're loyal they're dedicated. Unfortunately. We wanted. What we wanted to see was how we get out of this cycle. Which was so disturbed and when I picked up the paper this morning and read an article that could've been printed in the Boston Globe in 1979. Or 1940. -- 1930. It's always the same threat. It always goes back because the system that produces the threat is to -- This is why Afghanistan. As the birthplace and the and the graveyard of empires. I believe is perhaps fate for the United States. And our future will be determined on how we decide to handle it. Continuing to chase located in the mountains. If Osama bin Laden is even there. While neglecting society building civil society building and helping the Afghan civilians that have been ravaged by 36 years of war. I think would be. A very very serious mistake. So I don't know if that answers your question not that."

" The listed with the one who deals with that."

" You know I I believe I I my attitude is that. We have a lot of problems with their institutions so I feel it's very important focus on individuals. Rather than institutions these institutions need phenomenal reforming in a lot of times these individuals. Take on the -- the mantle of the institution that would make that they drop that and become a person. We deal -- person to person and I think that's a lot of what a -- since ideas about. You no longer. Think in terms of the institutional imperative you think in terms of what's before your eyes and you see things differently. And I do believe that part of the problem with American foreign policy and I don't think it's unique to America I think it's part of the the the idea of of going out into the world and assuming that you have something good to bring somebody else. And then when you go to other countries you take this attitude with you in and you decide to make them better by. -- by bringing what you have hope that really may not be the best attitude to bring to the world. And we may have to rethink. That idea and there's a lot of that attitude. Towards. I think in in terms of what to the Afghans need to rebuild really has to come from the Afghans and it really it and I know that. In terms of the Karzai government we really have to recognize that the Karzai government right now. Is really functioning at this same disadvantage that Barbara harm law was functioning. When he was viewed as the puppet of the enough of of the Soviet Union. So we're really in the same paradigm again. In terms of what's what is becoming a crisis and once again it doesn't solve the problem so the idea that. We can help another country by imposing. Our ideas by and I I think that term is you know we we bring our you know western style democracy. Well I think that. We have to recognize that we really should be actually taking care of our own democracy and there are a lot of people in this country who are concerned about it. So poor weak to -- it to say we should bring our. The democracy that now needs its own reforming to another country."

" Right Charleston -- as one very quick. Intervention. A comparison between Bob but I -- And comic -- side. Strikes me as a little strange in one respect. They have held several elections. In Afghanistan. Suits on mr. Karzai. Became president and definitely his. He was brought in. By the United Nations -- the United Nations negotiators without breaking news you know played a very large role in this. There have been several elections that have been certified free and fair or not just by the United States but -- a lot of the places. My question is -- how many elections do you think. Opera com and opera Carmen went through that we're free and fair I do think there is when you won't -- between the two."

" There's no question I wasn't them comparing him literally I was only comparing. -- the the the problem that fear that that that there is perception. That there isn't it an outside influence whether it was civil union -- whether it's the United States that does interfere with any Afghan politician's ability to be able to function at the highest level within Afghanistan. And I think that there that there was you know that that today hit it that President Karzai is definitely struggling. With that perception. That some of his decisions may have. Been affected too much by American. Directive sent him. Pardon -- so please call him."

" Thank you. My name is -- sleep. I'm enough on American. And -- stuff on I would like to thank you professor them. Of this event -- at times columnist. Four of their book and Afghanistan. And talking about Afghanistan. Like to say that. Since my. Being hit in the past 26 years after the Russians came I came to Massachusetts. I met columnists about. Ten years it was -- should have the September 11 I go to know them. And I found them that. There are probably among the very few. American journalists. Who has a sense of understanding. About the history -- recent history of confidence on. And the politics and Afghanistan. In appreciate -- work and I think that book I bought it in an entry and it has not finished the whole book. I think I came hedges say current I don't want to ask any question. Because I know the country of my origin. And the people of my people -- the subject of this discussion. That could be a lot of questions and I probably have to answer. But just. Getting to the question oppressive Dunbar from Paul did what caused the Soviets. Two to be defeated them to leave Afghanistan. I was -- Russians came. And it and I continue to be that for three years. And and I -- but then I went back packs them. And I was with dementia due for a few months. At that takes you back to that this city the past has city. I that I saw that that does the Russian war in Afghanistan. Was becoming and I and ending well. There was a lot of killing. A lot of distractions. Villages. Million people probably what killed. Four million became refugees. But the war was not ending. There was some additions and call them. And the capital and in north cities. -- is what celebrating victories. In movies and Hamels but in the countryside it was walk. So. I'm afraid. I've been to Afghanistan ten times in the past seven years since September 11. And a participant in the reconstruction. That. And I and and I think this -- city yet it's at Canadian than getting a feeling it. I hope not. Then we're getting in the situations. The Russians -- facing. That kind of you know me losing. My hope. That. That we -- hoping for a the future and Afghanistan. Especially after September 11 it was so much -- I can see that 95%. Of that. And hoping and support think Americans. But this time passed. Especially in the past two years. Things -- worsening conditions and so I'm I'm a little bit worried about. If something not change. Dramatically. Strategically."

" I don't know what's going to happen. What do you think that might be."

" Well and it is okay. In a way I'm happy that things have changed here in the United States first of all that. The election that Obama came things have changed so this is something that. That gives us. A sense of hope. Secondly. I'm still waiting to see where. The new administration policy on Afghanistan would go. There are new uses but I think I'm I'm kinda hopeful that that President Obama. Is not making a sudden decision. To do I think he's holding on things he's thinking he's he's he's looking around to see what would be the best option. I hit about a minute that he. Increase. That I cannot make any comment about that. And I think on the other side is Liz mentioned. -- is them. Who to win. The hearts and minds of people. In Afghanistan and we had the hearts and minds of people at the beginning. And it looks that we are what we keep losing day. This -- reconstruction. Is is a big issue. I've been involved in projects and I'm responsible for the design of some of them are just projects and Afghanistan. And I know how it went how it went and -- it that's going to."

" I'm gonna quote from I'm gonna quote machine. American companies have control of rebuilding Afghan input was ignored. American companies have control of rebuilding that insured the benefits went outside the country. This undermined the local rebuilding efforts and wasted an opportunity to advance local development which should have been the foundation for reconstruction."

" You regime machine has had personal experience with what went wrong in terms of the reconstruction efforts he's he says that."

" I think this is a wonderful -- I think that they gathering here this is this very important new book is very important. And I just don't want to stop my. Talk goes I don't have anymore questions. And I do thank you all thank you for coming."

" My name to -- mostly come with Matt's -- action. And related organizations. Is Sarah chase was here. I guess at Christmas time to visit her mother. And she is I can't remember whether I sold her on bill moyers. Are on sixty minutes until almost the only thing -- ever watch. And she's very impressive. In her dedication and -- has soared on native in no way. But when she was asked about and and military an increase in US soldiers -- yes we need that for security. And -- some of us think that the presence of foreign troops is what keeps the town on active so I've wondered what she. Where you come out on on that."

" here it's. And if there's a -- is the issue of of military. Has to really be turned into the issue of security. Okay the issue of security I think is with Sarah's talking about and it translates that right now because again. The Afghan civil society has not been stabilized enough to really build a proper. Military Afghan military and Afghan militia. So therefore requires foreign troops in order to keep the stability. But the foreign troops are also part of the problem so there's no question you -- we dealing with the kind of catch 22. But in seven years it is really shocking that so much of the fundamental rebuilding has not happened yet and I think that's what Americans have to begin to grasp. That that one of the reasons that we still need to think in terms of security. Okay and then and considered the military as the security outside uniform for a foreign forces as that that security. His because of that problem that we have in terms of the Afghans being able to handle this on their own. This is really at at dangerous situation. If the military at this point just all. Left if there's certainly no chance that that the Taliban wouldn't be able to really just take over whether the Afghans could. -- deal with it or not that's another question I certainly can't be sure or what the outcome of that would be but it would seem that. You know it would be very it would be very challenging considering that there is so little rebuild at this point. So these are part of the complexities that are not talked about -- to surge on not to surge. Without any of this complexity being brought into. What we really needs to be done again -- stability civil society building security. What their reforms they come in the one thing that has always happened it has to go through the Afghan people have to go through the government of Afghanistan. And this is where. That we've really had a a problem because he really has been -- over and over and over arching. -- view of what to do and at this point because of the problems with the construction of the Afghan people are losing hope I think is as you indicated."

" From what I understand just about the only thing that that might be able to calmed down the insurgency at this point. Would be that the United States would agree. At least agree to agree that there will be a timeline for when everyone will be. Because the situation right now. Is such a model. It's been an intellectual model from the very beginning but the situation at this point the European some Europeans fight some Europeans don't. They fight in different parts of the country they have the -- provinces which they're responsible for. The the Americans the British the Canadians. Are doing the bulk of the fighting taking the bulk of the casualties. It's not distributed fairly. There's no coordination when the aid comes in during the Bush Administration the -- situation was absolutely ludicrous in terms of is only Holly's not was essentially running his own operation from the White House. The State Department was running its operation USA ID was running its operations and private contractors running our operations and no one was talking to anybody else. They were all talking to each they were to do -- talking to each other they were just talking to themselves. So. You can. We can only hope that Richard Holbrooke will will be able to pull some of these then these threads together and make whole a whole -- it. In order to actually get some stuff going -- end and pull it out of the fire because right now it's and it's really in a very very bad place in the United States cannot afford. To have this collapse."

" He's another element to -- that is the the the the unmanned flights that are killing so many civilians. That his face big crisis that would -- top military again. How how are they going to be utilizing the going to be utilized to basically help support. The Afghan people to regain their their security so they can regain a civil society or it is even going to be a focus on getting al-Qaeda. And trying to find bin Laden and and a lot of civilians getting killed in the meantime you know we think that the first. Commanded really should be stopped killing Afghans this is not a war against the Afghan people. You can't possibly claim that it's good to. Policy. To basically kill I think the pin numbers or something astonishing like you know for every one asking and that's kill civilian you're basically turning. Into ten colleague I mean this is the kind of ratio you're getting. And the actual amount of people that they get who might really be genuine targets that this kind of assassination. Some select one in five so. This is again you're looking at why take such a terrible -- you'd think just based on. Practical assessment alone it would not be good choice. Never mind you morality issue --"

" We don't understand why the United States has not. Said. Set specific rules in motion fort. Their relationship with the Pakistan ISI this seems to be perhaps it's because the situation is -- monolith. It's quite possible that there are various interests working here I mean it's very interesting to see it at certain times that. We have the oil pipeline interest that's one -- and that's one set of agendas that comes out of the Middle East. We have the Saudi interest moving up into south Central Asia that we have the religious motivations that's another set of motivations that it plays a factor. In all of these people have different deep they're did their different actors in different theaters so that under the cover of the United States government or the CIA or the ISI or whatever you've got a number of different factions functioning for different interests. So like as they say I I think what has to be done and why it hasn't happened in the Afghan theater I don't really know specifically."

" But the biggest interest is not the war on terror. In Obama's not critic of what the war retirees garner all the whole Bush's war on terror retire. It in. So the reason for being in Afghanistan is to get the 9/11 terrorists. And when they 9911 terrorists are still in the White House. So articulate humble roots the the approach a little bit. -- little -- more than of course we weren't help the Afghan people of course. Well if we help the Afghan people and we stabilize Afghan society then we we basically undermines the basis by which -- grows. So that's always the case that's not just Afghanistan -- anyway right but it's not from direction the to right to choose which school mark. We have to face obstacles. Yeah we do. We have to understand what it is artists and with anyone that's interested -- our global research starts the day. Thank you."

" But my question has to do with the fact that we're on the eve of a new administration. And I'm interested in asking. Ambassador bombard you can give your view on what you would hope. Would be the best situation. Concerning. Obama's approach to Afghanistan. I don't know step which on the spot you you have had a chance to think about this in the same way that perhaps are the two guests are but. You obviously have a lot of knowledge of the area. And I would I think it would be beneficial for us. To have a chance to do that I'd also like that start to journalist. Yes the same question. Under the ideal circumstance. What should the Obama administration do in Afghanistan. Mixture of both turner pictures civilian relief. Who does that. Americans. Other current car roll kinds of people. What. You know to hear from them. -- everything worked exactly. As you would like. What would the American presence in Afghanistan beat. And and again. And -- approach on the spot maybe this is not something that you've thought about if you have. I think it would add to our discussion."

" Alright while I'm wolf as the moderator I do not want to. Want to monopolize time and we'll try to be brief I have thought about this. And I think that the that the administration and the whole international community faces. Terrible challenge in dealing with Afghanistan and Pakistan which as I said in my opening. Remark is I think we're joined at the head. I think that our policy should be based on two. Two prongs. First to vote I think that we should. Be. Looking forward to open a dialogue and perhaps a regional discussion. Among the the many interest -- parties that there are around Afghanistan the site here is not original to me I want to put into a quick footnote in a plug. For the article that was in foreign affairs about four or five months ago. It's written by mr. Rasheed. Who has written that the Pakistani journalist who's written a number of noted books and Afghanistan and Pakistan. And Barnett Rubin who is a leading American expert on Afghanistan. They make the point that there are many tradeoffs. If we get talking. With the Iranians as we seem to be planning to do and get involve India and Pakistan. And Russia. We will find that there there are common interests. That we can perhaps pursue in defusing this conflict. I think the second point. That is very important and perhaps more difficult more challenging. But the concrete rewards I think the more obvious and that is. To get into V. Federally administered tribal areas. Pakistan and discuss wells in your book on the other side of the that Durand line. The border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Not so much with predators. And I'm half hearted. Strikes by the Pakistani government. As wins. And aid program. That we need to recognize an advance is probably not going to pass the USA ID -- house thinking you get the USA ninety. Good housekeeping seal of approval it is a question of getting money out on the ground. And to begin creating jobs. With industries. That. That give employment. In those areas. It should be done I think with a mix of -- that in mind and public money. In the knowledge that these are not necessarily going to be at least initially moneymaking ventures. But they aren't going to give the alternative. To al-Qaeda is short term. Career that they offered to young. Two young Afghans and pakistanis and I think one of the most tragic things in this tragedy. Is that our phones have now joined the the the the passion. Of blowing themselves up. And and it's as a measure of their desperation. After months during the during the struggle in the 1980s. Gave their lives very fair as as. They sold their lives as extensively as they could they did not like. The idea of the -- the suicidal frontal assault. Much preferred to. To lay a trap and and get the job done that way. I think those are two elements so we have to deal with as far as the troops search is concerned. I think we should not. Be optimistic that that is going. Do very much. I certainly agree with the having lived in March the the the Soviets. The Soviet military. Operations. In the -- could find it very hard to live in Koppel for very long without seeing. Evidence of the Soviet military in the form of it PCs rolling through the streets and Soviet soldiers on the streets and I wonder. Why it and they they perhaps weren't weren't visible view was somebody trying to put on me. A public relations effort at their own to the public relations not invented in Thailand Madison avenue. A slight bit of disparity there forgive me but I think that the the thrust of the effort has to be. Regional engagement in trying to get the many problems that are connected with this problem settled and then to. Give -- designed to create jobs and eventually. To bring the federally administered tribal areas under the control of the Pakistan government. I'm sorry that was a longer answer than I intended. But I had thought about it and you asked -- thank you for letting me -- and I just wanted to make."

" Charles the that was 1981. That references to that the Soviets were nowhere EC. Dot in 1983. 1983. And they were out on the streets -- guy we -- I'm just in the -- 81981 to miss the data doesn't make any difference so a lot of Soviet. That's. Just. So things happened this."

" This was it was interesting because when I came back from CBS news with the footage. On what was going on and Campbell the women's schools the schools that have been burned down. The person at CBS news said to -- He says not much there. So what you mean not much there -- that this is the war that's going on so he says well I didn't read about it in the New York Times. So this was. This is kind of what we were dealing with during the time period we went there in 1983 we had a lot more freedom from our Afghans. That were running the show and we did get a chance to actually sheets in fact. What was interesting was I want to tell you this is a very interesting little story ends are now the second. When we were there in 1983. I had got the Foreign Minister. To agreed that there would be no sensory. The the documentation we were doing that was part of -- Would bring Roger Fisher has said look I said if you want to -- to be honest with you you have to be honest with us if we see it on the street and shoot it then. It -- its mind I get to take it home. And so he said yes and we get this I can just say this on camera so yes yes that's fine there's no problem with that we have nothing to hide. So we get that'll last the day before were about to leave. And we get in a tape we get a note from the censor the official censor the Afghan sensor and he says. You have to comply and you have to get all your tapes stamped but Frist that reviewed them to decide what gets taken out and what get what leaps. So I said -- and now I -- you don't understand. That's not our agreement we have an agreement with the Foreign Minister he stands up when he says he was a cult -- believe he says. I don't work for the former pastor. I work for myself and you are not taking those tapes out here without me censoring."

" So Charlie you almost had a basket full of tapes thrown over your embassy didn't. From Paul Fitzgerald courtesy of Paul Fitzgerald was not going to get his take sensor that time I would have been glad to have them and I wouldn't have sent to him. It's good it's good to know that. It took six hours as it turned out as it turned out I I finally they they finally did get a call in fact I wore my tie. That I worry that day I wore this evening. The the TD PA used to when they go through their checkpoints they had red ties to show that they were members of the Communist Party did waive them out the window. So I had my red polo ties Marty now but I still have it. It's like wait we get to the checkpoint and wave my tie up the Linda hope they didn't notice to polo player."

" But. Uncle harassing them with united for justice with peace and I guess my concern is that. The whole US intervention in Afghanistan. Since 2001 has been disaster we've. And so which we were told we went in there to catch al-Qaeda. And to bring democracy to Afghanistan to improve the rights of women and none of those things have happened and maybe this a little democracy I guess there was some dialogue between the panelists on that but. I think he has I think Karzai is perceived as a as a puppet and opium production this gone through the roof and -- by the tales of some warlords are really in control. Parliament and have -- influence throughout the country and the rights of women are being protected. And US military is attacking wedding parties and and and harming civilians and killing -- civilians them. Insurgents. And probably a lot of the support for the answer insurgency has been generated because of the heavy handed tactics that the US military or just because resentment of a foreign occupying power. So I would like to know what is really. The interest of the United States and Afghanistan what is the real reason the United States is in Afghanistan I think we've been kicking around the notion that we might be able to improve civil society we might be able to rebuild. That country but I want -- of the United States really has the ability to do that or is the United States -- to do more harm than good. And this is really trying to help the people of Afghanistan. Really part of the reason is there or is it part of the big geopolitical game. That is trying to put upon on the -- to stop. Stop by the powers are scared of the Paris is just frankly stir up a lot of instabilities that. So that everyone -- you know start fighting each side and policy. That that we haven't heard him mention there hasn't hasn't the future as as positive role to play like task -- this --"

" There's no question that. We've had the same thoughts in fact. We've come to the conclusion that if if the United States really wanted to bring. Democracy stability all of these things there's no question that other choices would have been me so one does have to add more than what is really going on. And I do think that we really have to begin to demand an answer to that it doesn't add up. And and that's and that's why you know when I said you can look back over twenty over twenty years and see. The record proper recommendations the right things -- it was never implemented. So the question has to be why wasn't -- implemented. And that. Question just doesn't seem to get asked by Arab media. It doesn't seem to be a constant focus and once again I think if I would really hold. Someone accountable for the crisis that we are in today I would hold. Are journalists are our media. Okay if when your media fails. Everything else fails. -- the media really gets on top of the story that's how we get Clinton's staff that's how we learn about it that's how we find out. When things are avoided if they they didn't hit me. And then all of a suddenly burst out we'll know what that's like me we all have personal lives we understand that what what that means. And here we are or where it is very complex society very complex world. And we're discovering that there's a tremendous amount of activity that's going on behind the scenes and we are simply not informed that. And I think it is you know you mentioned that feeling so ignorant about what was going on based on the few things that we mentioned tonight."

" I'm assuming that. There are many many other areas that I don't know what's going I just had happened to feel a lot more about Afghanistan that -- a whole complex world out there and our media is not doing a very good job in. Delivering the complexity of the real world that's going on out there."

" We always felt when we were dealing with this story that it was really as much a story about Washington as it was Afghanistan. And it was so little concern for Afghanistan over the years and the individuals like Mike mister Dunbar and up. Some of the other people who've been involved -- it you you do fall in love with the place and you do understand people and what they're trying to achieve and you do what you can do. Within the institution in order to help them but but even today in Washington it's very hard. Do I do not get the impression that there really understand what it is it's happening there. And and they are trying to apply fixes it just simply are completely inappropriate and will not."

" Work. I sometimes think that. The world has grown up but the leadership hasn't you know -- bear that we are usually treats I think is if we're still five years old relatively speaking in there they are the adults and where the children. They don't realize that we actually the world has grown -- the population of the world is from. And are we just seem to have -- season in in getting that across to the leadership when we."

" There in 2002 we made a point of interviewing the American media people that -- there. In each and every one of them said the same thing they -- I can write about the complexity of what's happening here which is hard to understand because they weren't prepared for it. But they said that the editors back in New York -- the editor back in Washington simply won't run the story. Because he says they don't even have the language in the United States any longer to describe. The what's gone on here the audiences in the United States haven't been prepared over the last 25 years for the complexities of the world that we're facing. So what happens is is that issues like Iraq or Afghanistan or -- issues in South America fall into the hands. Of clicks. Within our own government. Who know the levers of power who were very fassel. And who know how to get things done and how to get money money. -- collected for certain causes or whatever and that becomes American policy and then. 95% of us are left. Sitting there saying how did that happen what are we doing there. And then of course when the investigation if there is an investigation comes forward we see that it was a small group of people who Wynton. Concocted. A scheme and managed to pull it off. So I think the name I think they refer to that is dining out that we dining out in the US current. So weathered the Obama administration can. Pull it all together in in solidify that I don't know what when it comes to Afghanistan there really isn't much time."

" All right wolf thank you very much Paul Fitzgerald. Thank you very much it was for the --"